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FOURTH REVIEW CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE TREATY ON THE NON-PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

PROVISIONAL SUMMARY RECORD OF THE 7TH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva
on Thursday, 23 August 1990, at 3 p.m.

President: Mr. de RIVERO (Peru)

later: Mr. KOSIN (Yugoslavia)

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General debate (continued)

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The meeting was called to order at 3.30 p.m.

GENERAL DEBATE (agenda item 12) (continued)

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea) said that, in view of the remarkable improvement in East-West relations, his delegation placed high hopes in the Fourth Review Conference, whose outcome would have a significant impact on the Non-Proliferation Treaty over the next five years and on its status beyond 1995. The dispute over its discriminatory nature notwithstanding, the Treaty had proved to be an effective instrument for preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and had thus contributed actively to maintaining international peace and security. The Republic of Korea welcomed the observer delegations sent by France, the People's Republic of China and other States, because their presence would further enhance the importance of the Conference and serve as a first step towards their eventual accession to the NPT.

Since becoming a signatory to the Treaty in April 1975, the Republic of Korea had faithfully complied with its obligations and would continue to do so in the future. His delegation stressed the importance of the complementarity of the three objectives embodied in the NPT, namely non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Those obligations must be met in an equitable and balanced manner. Regrettably, complaints persisted that the nuclear-weapon States and countries with advanced nuclear technology were still reluctant to transfer nuclear technology to States Parties that agreed not to develop nuclear weapons. With regard to the importation of nuclear materials and technology, States Parties often found themselves in a disadvantageous position as opposed to non-party States. Developing countries that fulfilled their obligations under the Treaty, including the IAEA safeguards agreements, were entitled to the international co-operation needed to develop nuclear energy for peaceful uses. Countries with advanced nuclear technology were called upon to provide those developing countries with every possible assistance and to relax restrictions on the transfer of sensitive technology and information and a stabe long-term supply of nuclear fuels.

Co-operation among developing States Parties in peaceful nuclear development also deserved the support of countries with advanced nuclear technology, and the non-proliferation régime should not be enforced to the detriment of research and development in that area. His delegation stressed

the important role of the United Nations Conference for the Promotion of International Co-operation in the Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy, held in Geneva in March-April 1987, and hoped that the Conference would be revived.

The safeguard measures under article III were central to the effectiveness of the NPT régime. The Republic of Korea had concluded a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA in October 1975 and had faithfully abided by it. It was regrettable that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, an NPT State Party with significant nuclear activities, had delayed committing itself to the safeguards agreement for almost five years, far beyond the legal deadline and in clear violation of its obligation under the Treaty. That posed a threat to the NPT régime. His delegation once again called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to conclude a full-scope safeguards agreement with the IAEA without further delay and to demonstrate its full compliance with the terms of the Treaty, thereby removing a stumbling-block to the reconciliation process on the Korean peninsula.

The safeguards agreements must not be used to promote a monopoly on nuclear materials and technology or to impose undue constraints on the transfer of nuclear materials and technology that might be detrimental to the development of nuclear energy for peaceful uses by the developing countries themselves. In the interests of enhancing the universality of the safeguards agreements, steps should also be taken by the nuclear-weapon States to broaden the area of voluntary application of safeguard measures. In that context, his delegation welcomed the conclusion by the People's Republic of China of a voluntary safeguards agreement with the IAEA in September 1988.

The protection of nuclear materials constituted another important dimension of the NPT, and adherence to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material would help to strengthen the Treaty. The Republic of Korea had submitted its instrument of ratification of the Convention in April 1982.

Major progress had been made in reducing nuclear weapons arsenals in the past five years, thereby improving East-West relations. A comprehensive test ban on nuclear weapons was essential in order to reverse vertical nuclear proliferation and would be an effective way to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States. A ban on nuclear testing could be achieved through a step-by-step approach that relied on effective verification. In that context, the establishment of an Ad Hoc Committee by the Conference on Disarmament to examine issues relating to a comprehensive

test ban was a positive development, as were the agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union on the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions.

The implementation of nuclear disarmament under article VI would be better served if placed under the responsibility of the IAEA, inasmuch as the safeguards agreement laid down in article III was under IAEA supervision. Lastly, it was to be hoped that the Conference would make a further contribution to international peace and security by reasserting its firm commitment to the Treaty and strengthening the authority of the non-proliferation régime.

Mr. EVANS (Australia) said that the end of the cold war and the resulting understandings and agreements offered new hop of lifting the oppressive threat of global nuclear war. But there was no room for the complaisant assumption that a nuclear holocaust was no longer possible. The reduction in tension between the super-Powers had not led to a decline in regional confrontations. The indefensible aggression committed by Iraq against its fellow Arab and sovereign neighbour, Kuwait, which warranted the most forthright condemnation by the international community, was the first crucial test of crisis management in the post-cold-war era. Events in the Middle East provided a sharp reminder that deep enmities persisted in many parts of the world and that naked aggression was still not a thing of the past. Furthermore, the capacity of various nations rapidly to develop nuclear weapons was all too apparent, not only in the Middle East, but in a number of other traditionally volatile regions of the world as well. Thus, the need for a joint effort at building confidence and underpinning security was in some ways more urgent than ever before. In an interdependent world, regional conflicts could not necessarily be isolated. Nuclear disarmament and the prevention of nuclear weapons proliferation must remain essential objectives for the international community.

Although a number of countries had still not joined the NPT, the Treaty had been a remarkable success. It had acquired a position of vital importance as the norm for responsible behaviour in the nuclear field and had become a pillar of the international and regional security framework. It was the foundation for most international trade and co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Without the assurances offered by the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system, distrust of nuclear intentions would feed regional security problems, and international nuclear trade and co-operation would dwindle.

The continued success of the NPT must not be taken for granted. The Treaty would only continue to play an important role if it had the active support of the States Parties. That included making renewed efforts to achieve universal membership in the Treaty through dialogue with non-party States.

Since the previous Conference, Treaty membership had grown, and co-operation among NPT members had increased. The Conference on Disarmament had recently agreed on a mandate for an Ad Hoc Committee to discuss a nuclear test ban. The Treaty of Rarotonga had entered into force. Chernobyl had given renewed emphasis to the importance of international co-operation in nuclear safety. The Convention on Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident and the Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or Radiological Emergency had entered into force; Australia had ratified both conventions, and it called for the widest possible adherence to them. Concerns about the quality of the environment and the serious effects that global warming would have on it had led to a reassessment of the place of nuclear power.

However, there had also been disturbing developments since the Third Review Conference in regard to nuclear supply and the lack of progress in concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA. His Government welcomed the decision by a number of major nuclear suppliers since 1985 to adopt the full-scope safeguards, in particular Japan and the Federal Republic of Germany. It was, however, regrettable that over the past five years a small number of suppliers had entered into agreements to provide major nuclear items to non-party States without requiring full-scope safeguards. It was especially unfortunate that certain members of the Treaty were among the suppliers concerned. His delegation called upon the Conference to adopt a clear statement that future supply of nuclear items under new agreements should take place only on the basis of full-scope safeguards.

Another development of concern to Australia was that not all States Parties had exhibited by their actions and words the support for the objective of non-proliferation that Treaty membership required. Certain actions and statements of one or two States Parties had called into question their intention to abide by their obligations; that was unacceptable. Further, the progress in concluding safeguards agreements with the IAEA had been disappointing. More than 50 such agreements remained outstanding. It was particularly disturbing when Treaty members operated nuclear facilities without safeguards and did not quickly comply with their obligation to

conclude a safeguards agreement. Australia urged a renewed effort by States Parties to the Treaty and by the Director-General of the IAEA to encourage the conclusion of such agreements.

Australia was particularly concerned that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, having joined the Treaty almost five years previously, continued to operate an unsafeguarded nuclear facility. Such inappropriate behaviour was an added element of uncertainty in Asia and the Pacific and an obstacle to improved bilateral relations with other States. It was to be hoped that the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea would report to its Government the depth of concern at the Conference about the continuation of that situation.

The existence of unsafeguarded facilities in non-nuclear-weapon States inevitably raised questions about their use and undermined regional and global security. Australia called upon all States outside the Treaty to adhere to it as soon as possible, to place all their nuclear activities under full-scope safeguards and to work together within the NPT for a more secure world.

As to the future, there was reason to be optimistic. His Government looked forward to the day when South Africa and the whole of southern Africa would join the Treaty. His delegation welcomed the presence at the Conference of representatives of China and France and hoped that the re-examination of their attitude to the Treaty would result in early membership.

Further progress was also expected in reducing the nuclear weapons arsenals. Yet despite the disarmament steps already taken, there still existed some 50,000 warheads with a destructive capacity of nearly 16,000 megatons, equivalent to 3.3 tons of TNT for every man, woman and child on earth. The commitment to work not only towards putting an end to the nuclear arms race but also genuine nuclear disarmament was a central obligation under the NPT. A comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and a chemical weapons convention remained key priorities. Both agreements would play a major role in enhancing the disarmament process and preventing further proliferation. But in the pursuit of a chemical test ban, the NPT must not be placed in jeopardy.

A number of challenges remained: maintaining momentum in nuclear arms control; resolving regional disputes which could lead to further proliferation; encouraging all Parties to comply with the obligations of the Treaty; and finding the necessary resources for the IAEA to carry out its specific responsibilities at a time when there were significant new

developments in the nuclear fuel cycle. The 1990s would see a steady increase in the construction of power reactors and in commercial reprocessing, and even in at least one non-nuclear-weapon State. The rate of plutonium separation and the use of the separated material would be higher. The quantity of spent fuel stored would grow, with some stored away from reactors.

Those developments would place additional pressures on the IAEA. The safeguarding of fuel-cycle processing facilities was already absorbing a significant proportion of the Agency's safeguards resources. Safeguards arrangements, possibly more demanding of resources, would need to be developed for large-scale commercial reprocessing facilities and for the manufacture and use of mixed oxide fuels. It would also be necessary to decide whether and at what point safeguards on disposed wastes could be terminated. It was of central importance to the continued effectiveness of the NPT that the IAEA had the human and financial resources needed to carry out its safeguards programme. Maintaining the credibility and effectiveness of IAEA safeguards must be a clear objective of every member of the Treaty.

The momentous changes in the international order in the past two years had reduced the threat of nuclear proliferation, but the Treaty would not remain effective if the States Parties took it for granted. Australia would play its part in ensuring that the objectives of the Treaty were achieved. The NPT was a permament feature of the international security framework, and his Government was deeply committed to its continuation in force indefinitely after 1995.

Mr. OMAR (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya) stressed the importance of the statement made at a previous meeting by the Yugoslav representative speaking on behalf of the neutral and non-aligned countries Parties to the NPT.

At a conference held in Paris in 1989, his country had appealed to all States to ban nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction in the framework of full respect for the principles and purposes of the Charter of the United Nations. The decision taken to promote nuclear disarmament had also concerned other weapons of mass destruction including chemical and biological weapons.

His delegation strongly supported the NPT which had proved extremely useful for the maintenance of international peace and the avoidance of nuclear war that could destroy the whole planet. The Treaty had played an important role in preventing horizontal proliferation; it was essential that all its provisions should be faithfully observed and that all efforts should be taken to promote its objectives. In accordance with the eighth and ninth preambular

paragraphs and article VI, cessation of the nuclear arms race and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control constituted the essential objective. In the Conference on Disarmament, his delegation had accordingly expressed its strong interest in nuclear weapons control and in the negotiations thereon. It therefore supported all bilateral and multilateral measures in that connection.

Part of the strategy of certain countries was based on the possession of nuclear weapons for use as a deterrent, something that required them to keep stocks of nuclear weapons. As a result, they would still need to conduct underground tests. As his delegation saw it, such an approach involved a vicious circle detrimental to the goals of the NPT and to the aspirations of the peoples of the world, whose only desire was for peace and security. It was essential to resolve to put an end to that situation and to call for efforts in the right direction. His own country was totally opposed to the further development of nuclear weapons as well as to all nuclear testing.

There was also an urgent need for guarantees to be extended to the non-nuclear-weapon States to forestall the use, or the threat of use, of nuclear weapons against them. The present Conference could not be content with expressing regret at inaction in the matter, as had been done at the previous Review Conference.

Nuclear weapons were possessed at present by régimes that would not hesitate to use them. It should be remembered, moreover, that some of those powers were aggressive and were destabilizing their regions in Africa and the Middle East. He recalled in that regard that the Third Review Conference had "noted the great and serious concerns expressed about the nuclear capability of South Africa and Israel". Israel was not, of course, a party to the NPT. The Third Review Conference had "further noted the calls on all States for the total and complete prohibition of the transfer of all nuclear facilities, resources or devices to South Africa and Israel". The present Review Conference should go beyond mere expressions of concern. It should take action in conformity with the principles stemming from article VII of the NPT. Other nuclear-weapon-free areas ought to be established and no effort should be spared to achieve the Treaty's purposes.

It was a matter for regret that little or nothing had been achieved in pursuance of the aims set forth in the sixth and seventh preambular paragraphs and article IV. Article IV proclaimed the inalienable right of all parties to the NPT to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes "without discrimination". That provision was intended to apply to

developed and developing countries alike. In actual fact, some countries were being denied the possibility of participation in scientific progress and research. The present conference should emphasize that the benefits of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should really be made available to the developing countries, thereby giving full meaning to article VI of the NPT. In that connection, the IAEA had a leading role to play. He wished at that point to recall the barbarous aggression in 1981 by Israel against the Iraqi nuclear installation at Osirak intended exclusively for peaceful purposes. The aim of that act of aggression had been to cut off the Arab countries from participation in that form of scientific and technological progress. Such unjustifiable Israeli aggression had been widely condemned in the Security Council and in the General Assembly. Chapter VII of the Charter on, action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression, was relevant. The present Review Conference should take due note of that matter and of all its implications. Closer attention to the issue of the security of nuclear installations was plainly necessary.

His delegation fully approved of the activities of the IAEA which made its expertise available in the service of verification and in providing safeguards. It had been gratifying to hear the statement by the Director-General of the IAEA and to learn particulars of the Agency's assistance programme for the next five years. Equally satisfying was the progress being made in the application of nuclear technology to agriculture and medicine.

An increase in the number of States Parties would further the cause of the non-proliferation régime. The NPT itself could be strengthened by the respect for its provisions, and more particularly observance of those provisions by the nuclear Powers. Lastly the Conference's final document should lay stress on non-discrimination in the application of article VI of the Treaty and should emphasize support of, and urge extension of the NPT.

Mr. Kosin (Yugoslavia), Vice-President, took the Chair.

Mr. ARTEAGA (Venezuela) said that the Conference afforded a particularly favourable opportunity for promoting multilateral efforts in the area of nuclear disarmament. In the past five years, there had been some remarkable developments in world affairs. In their Declaration of November 1985, the United States and the Soviet Union had agreed that a nuclear war could not be won and that it should never occur. The 1989 Non-Aligned Summit had welcomed the signature for the first time in history of

a treaty to eliminate some of the existing nuclear weapons, the INF Treaty, and had expressed the hope that it would lead the way to the adoption of concrete measures for the total elimination of nuclear weapons. By their Washington Declaration of June 1990, the Presidents of the United States and the Soviet Union had reaffirmed their determination to conclude by the end of the year the START treaty on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive weapons.

Similarly, the member countries of the Warsaw Pact had adopted on 7 July 1990 a declaration which stressed that present developments in Europe were creating the necessary conditions for discarding the model of security based on blocs, and that the elements of confrontation which had previously appeared in the documents of the Warsaw Pact and the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance were no longer in step with the spirit of the times. For its part, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), in its London declaration concerning a modified Alliance, had recognized that security and stability were not based exclusively on the military dimension and had invited the member States of the Warsaw Pact to conclude a joint non-aggression declaration. An invitation to visit NATO had likewise been extended to the President of the Soviet Union and the representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries.

Those welcome developments offered clear expectations not only to European and North American countries but also to non-aligned and neutral countries which did not possess nuclear weapons. A new concept of common security based on interdependence and co-operation was taking shape in the minds of the leaders of the great Powers. That new approach to security would be facilitated by the present situation of the two main Powers, which were facing socio-economic and environmental difficulties, a growing external debt and increasing budgetary deficits: there was a triangular relationship between disarmament, development and security.

His delegation was attending the present Conference in the hope that the nuclear Powers would finally move towards the fulfilment, albeit partial fulfilment, of article VI of the Treaty. He wished to stress his use of the word "partial", because although the present situation with regard to disarmament was less unfavourable than when the three previous Review Conferences had been held, the expectations in the matter might well be disappointed. Article VI set forth the undertaking to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms

race at an early date - an undertaking which, read in conjunction with the tenth preambular paragraph of the NPT, had a close connection with the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty, in itself an indispensable measure for the cessation of the nuclear arms race.

In the absence of a total prohibition of nuclear tests, the nuclear arms race would continue indefinitely with new and more sophisticated nuclear weapons. Accordingly, his delegation could not accept the allegation that the main obligation of nuclear Powers under article VI was simply to work towards nuclear disarmament and that the duty in question was being fulfilled through the conclusion of the INF Treaty and the START negotiations. Only a treaty embodying a comprehensive nuclear test ban could be considered as a first indispensable instrument for bringing an end to the nuclear arms race.

Consequently, his delegation could not accept the "step-by-step" approach to solve the grave problem of the qualitative aspects of vertical proliferation. It considered that the bilateral treaties on underground nuclear weapon tests and on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would merely serve to justify the continuation of the nuclear weapons race; their entry into force constituted a step backwards since they purported to extend the limits of nuclear testing, whereas the demand of the majority of the countries of the international community, and particularly the non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the NPT, was the total and final cessation of nuclear tests.

A comprehensive test ban treaty constituted an immmediate priority objective and the means of preventing vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was for that reason that Venezuela, together with five other countries, had requested the convening of an Amendment Conference for the 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty with the aim of converting the Treaty into a comprehensive test-ban convention. The Amendment Conference, which would be held in New York in January 1991, could supplement the work being carried out in the Conference on Disarmament.

It should be noted that the Conference on Disarmament had so far made no progress in the negotiations on such fundamental topics as a nuclear test ban, cessation of the nuclear weapons race and prevention of nuclear war; nor had it been able to work out effective international agreements that afforded non-nuclear-weapon States guarantees against the use or the threat of use of such weapons. The non-nuclear-weapon States had renounced the so-called "nuclear option" by acceding to the NPT; they were therefore entitled to

demand firm and convincing legal guarantees that they would never be threatened with the use of nuclear weapons, or still less be the actual victims of the use of such weapons. The guarantee should be unconditional, just as their renunciation in 1967 of the possession of all types of nuclear weapons had been unconditional when they had signed the Treaty of Tlatelolco and later the NPT.

The commitment to non-proliferation and the use of nuclear energy solely for peaceful purposes stemmed from the conviction that the possession of nuclear weapons would in no way enhance the security of Venezuela and would be detrimental to the security of neighbouring States. His country therefore actively supported the work of International Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (OPANAL) to ensure that those countries of the region not yet having done so would accede to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. To that end, it had in 1989 proposed an amendment to that Treaty to enable such States as Guyana and Belize to sign it. It would continue to participate actively to strengthen the nuclear-weapon-free zone in Latin America and the Caribbean and to ensure accession by all States in the region, including Cuba, Argentina, Brazil and Chile. It also supported the establishment of other nuclear-weapon-free zones in accordance with article VII of the NPT. The treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarotonga were examples of the efforts which non-nuclear weapon States were prepared to make in order to ensure regional security and contribute to the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons.

As to the inalienable right of all States Parties to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, he reiterated Venezuela's support for the IAEA safeguard system as a means of creating a climate of international confidence and of limiting horizontal proliferation. The system should therefore receive the moral and financial support of all IAEA member States. At the same time, however, the financial burden should be distributed in such a way that the greater part of the costs was borne by those countries with the most advanced nuclear technology. His country was pleased to note the establishment of an IAEA working group to look into that matter.

The transfer of nuclear technology, together with access to other technological know-how currently enjoyed by the industrialized countries could help to bridge the technological gap between the industrialized and the developing countries. His country therefore accorded priority to IAEA technical assistance and co-operation activities and was participating in its regional programme for Latin America. Increased financing was required for technical co-operation in order to ensure a better balance between promotion

activities and regulatory and supervisory activities. In that context, it was also appropriate to emphasize that developing non-nuclear-weapon States Parties should not be subject to any greater restriction on the transfer of nuclear technology than was established in the Treaty.

It was almost universally recognized that the Treaty was essential to maintain international peace and security and that it had contributed to limiting horizontal proliferation. If it was to continue to be effective, its provisions must be maintained integrally and without discrimination. Reciprocity in respecting the provisions and the balance of responsibilities and obligations between nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon States Parties was the best guarantee of the acceptability of the Treaty and the possibility of extending it beyond 1995.

Mr. AL-KOTAL (Iraq) said that his region was witnessing important events affecting the future of the peoples both in that region and throughout the world. While some of the events had been positive, others had had adverse effects and were threatening the States of the region in question and the national security and integrity of the Arab States as a whole.

The turning point in recent relations between Iraq and Iran represented an advance towards lasting peace between the two Muslim countries. A state of confrontation had been transformed into a state of peace and understanding which would strengthen the safety and security of the region. However, the illegal foreign intervention in the affairs of the region, the mobilization of naval fleets, armies and aircraft in the Gulf and in the territories of some Arab States were negative events. The fleets had been mobilized contrary to international law and were aimed at blockading and starving the people and children of Iraq. They included nuclear-operated ships and ships carrying nuclear weapons. It was reported that foreign land and air forces had spread nuclear weapons among States of the region which were parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Such military intervention, together with other recent actions, were a flagrant violation of the aims and objectives of the Treaty and constituted a serious threat to non-nuclear-weapon States in the region and to the safety of their peoples and national resources. Immediate withdrawal of those foreign forces was the sole guarantee to ensure a peaceful solution to the current problem - a peaceful solution which should be found by the Arabs themselves.

His delegation reaffirmed the principles and aims of the Non-Proliferation Treaty: prohibition and limitation of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and general and complete nuclear disarmament to rid mankind of

the threat of nuclear disaster, yet recognition of the principle that States should be allowed to exercise their inalienable right to use peaceful nuclear energy under effective international supervision.

Recent years had shown that: (1) in relation to the obligations of non-nuclear-weapon States Parties to the Treaty not to develop, manufacture or acquire nuclear weapons, the role of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system should be strengthened and all States should ensure its effective implementation; (2) not enough progress was being made towards nuclear disarmament or prohibiton of nuclear testing; (3) there had been an increase in individual actions to restrict the transfer of peaceful nuclear technology, with some States Parties slandering others to justify the blockade imposed on such transfer, while at the same time giving Israel - a non-party State - justification for launching a military attack against a State Party, namely the destruction in 1981 of the Tammuz reactor in Iraq, which was under supervision of the IAEA; (4) no positive acts had been taken to guarantee the safety of non-nuclear-weapon States against the use or threats of nuclear weapons; and (5) some States Parties to the Treaty had continued to provide assistance to racist entities enabling them to acquire nuclear-weapon capability; Israeli nuclear weapons had become a threat to the security of the States of the region and South Africa had become a source of danger for Africa.

He reemphasized the willingness of Iraq to create a zone in the Middle East which would be free of weapons of destruction - including nuclear, biological and chemical weapons - under effective international supervision.

His delegation hoped that States Parties were aware of their responsibility for ensuring peace and security for all, on an equal footing, and ensuring implementation of the Treaty on the basis of: (1) a more balanced Treaty with fewer gaps and less discrimination; (2) emphasis on the universal nature of the Treaty and the need for all States, especially Israel and other countries in the region, to adhere to and respect article IX, paragraph 2 of the Treaty; (3) détente in East-West relations as a source of encouragement to nuclear-weapon States to fulfil their obligation to do away with such weapons and impose a ban on their manufacture and testing; (4) until those aims were achieved, a positive guarantee to nuclear-weapon States that their safety and security would be guaranteed against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any nuclear-weapon States, whether in an overt or covert manner; and (5) recognition of the right of all States to use peaceful technologies according to their needs, under effective international

controls. It was his hope that States Parties would prepare for 1995 on such a basis, thereby ensuring the requisite practical objectives of the Treaty.

Lastly, he wished to ask whether the representative of Australia was aware that imposing a blocade against any State without being instructed to do so by the United Nations Security Council was considered an act of aggression which deserved the condemnation of the international community and that Australia, by participating in imposing such an illegal blockade against Iraq was carrying out such an act of aggression.

Mr. DUNA (Turkey) said that his Government considered the Non-Proliferation Treaty to be one of the most important multilateral arms control agreements concluded to date. By considerably reducing the risk of nuclear war, the Treaty had contributed to the process of international security and arms control. Turkey, being a party to the Treaty, held the view that strict adherence to its provisions by both nuclear-weapon and non-nuclear-weapon Parties was of vital importance. The NPT had long proved its value in safeguarding international peace, strengthening the security of States and promoting international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The preservation of the viability of the non-proliferation régime was a task of considerable importance, and it was therefore essential for the Conference to conclude its deliberations successfully.

Although the NPT had a larger membership than any other arms control treaty, two nuclear-weapon States as well as certain other important States that maintained unsafeguarded nuclear facilities were not parties to it. His delegation's pleasure in seeing France and China as observers at the Conference would be further enhanced if their presence could be taken as an indication of willingness to become States Parties in the near future. At a time of profound and rapid political change in some parts of the world, it was particularly important that the Treaty should be maintained and strengthened. While welcoming the newcomers, his delegation urged all States which had not yet acceded to the Treaty to do so as soon as possible.

The progress achieved in nuclear disarmament over the past five years represented a major step in the implementation of article VI of the Treaty. In that connection, he referred to the INF Agreement of 1988, the impending conclusion of a START agreement, to be followed by further talks on strategic balance issues, and the negotiations on the reduction of short-range nuclear forces expected to take place after the conclusion of the agreement on conventional forces in Europe. His delegation also welcomed the decision of

the Conference on Disarmament to discuss at informal meetings the topics of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament and prevention of nuclear war, including all related matters, and hoped that the debate on those items would be continued at the 1991 sessions of the Conference.

Progress on negative security assurances, a subject which had been on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament for many years, fell short of the desired level. Turkey shared the security concerns of non-nuclear States regarding the possible use or threat of use of nuclear weapons against them. The absence of appropriate measures to safeguard the security of non-nuclear-weapon States could undermine the objectives and provisions of the Treaty.

In connection with the test ban issue, he noted with satisfaction that the Conference on Disarmament had finally succeeded in agreeing on a mandate for an ad hoc committee. It also wished to pay tribute to the Group of Scientific Experts, which had achieved considerable progress towards the establishment of a global network for the exchange of seismic data, an important element in the future verification system of the test ban treaty. As to the Amendment Conference to be held in 1991 for the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the initiative of a group of countries which sought to convert that Treaty into a comprehensive one reflected the frustration of many States with the less than encouraging results of the depositaries' efforts to end test explosions. Unnecessary confrontation in that respect should, however, be avoided. The signing by the United States and the Soviet Union of the verification protocols to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty should be seen as a first step towards the banning of nuclear tests, and it was to be hoped that future negotiations would lead to further limitations upon the number and yield of nuclear test explosions and eventually to the end of all nuclear testing. A gradual, realistic and step-by-step approach towards that ultimate goal was called for. His delegation was of the opinion that further reductions of nuclear arsenals would also pave the way to a comprehensive test ban.

Nuclear power plants were one of his country's energy production options. Turkey, like many other countries, needed to co-operate with the technologically advanced States Parties on a non-discriminatory basis in the field of nuclear energy production as well as in nuclear research and development. In that connection, it should be stressed that the requirements of peaceful nuclear installations operating under IAEA safeguards in line with

the principles of the NPT must be met at all times; the suppliers should refrain from applying over-zealous restrictions going beyond the IAEA safeguards, something that would result in unwarranted limitation of technology transfer and co-operation among State Parties. Assistance to developing States Parties which had opted for nuclear energy was in the spirit of article IV of the Treaty. It was to be hoped that the nuclear-weapon States and the industrialized non-nuclear-weapon States would find ways and means, both technological and financial, of making nuclear power an accessible option for developing countries. The spread of non-power applications of nuclear energy among developing countries was encouraging; in that connection, he wished to commend IAEA's performance in the technical co-operation and safeguards field, which had undoubtedly contributed to the recent accessions to the NPT. His Government hoped that the developed countries contributions would be commensurate with the growing requirements of the Agency's technical co-operation activities in the developing world.

Lastly, on the question of extension of the Treaty, to be considered at the 1995 Review Conference, his Government stood ready to support an extension for a second period of 25 years under the conditions stipulated in article III, paragraph 3, and article X, paragraph 2 of the Treaty with a view to the final elimination of all nuclear weapons and the ending of nuclear testing during that period. He invited other delegations to express their support for extension of the Treaty, so that the final declaration of the present Review Conference might contain suitable language to that effect.

Mr. CHANG ON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, in his statement earlier in the meeting, the representative of South Korea had failed to mention that his country served as a military base for a foreign country and as a storage facility for that country's nuclear weapons. Refusal to allow foreign nuclear weapons and troops to be stationed in the territory of any non-nuclear-weapon State was one of the most important preconditions for the prevention of nuclear conflict. In the interests of the safety of the Korean people, the whole region and the world at large, as well as of the success of the present Conference, he appealed to the delegation of South Korea to speak about removing of foreign troops and nuclear weapons from its territory.

Mr. LEE (Republic of Korea), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that fulfilment by States Parties of their safeguards obligations with the IAEA under article III of the Treaty was automatic and mandatory and was not accompanied by any additional conditions. The attempt by the

representative of North Korea to introduce extraneous elements into the issue could not be justified and merely strengthened the suspicions and misgivings of other Parties which, for their part, were faithfully complying with their safeguards obligations.

Mr. CHANG ON (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) said he reserved the right to exercise his right of reply at a future date.

Mr. AL-SABAH (Kuwait), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that, as participants in the Conference were aware, on 2 August 1990 his small, peaceful country, a respected member of the international community, had been invaded by hundreds of tanks and tens of thousands of troops in a surprise attack by the Iraqi Government. The resulting disastrous situation was certainly not the responsibility of peace-loving Kuwait. Only a complete withdrawal by Iraq could bring that situation to an end. In deploring Iraq's insistence on flouting Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662 in violation of international law and practice, as well as its inhuman action of detaining large numbers of foreign nationals in Kuwait in violation of all human rights and fundamental freedoms, he wished to express his country's appreciation to those States which had adopted a stance against the Iraqi actions.

Mr. AL-MATOOK (Iraq), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, said that his delegation was opposed to the presence at the Conference of a delegation falsely claiming to represent Kuwait. That delegation had no legal status, and Iraq wished to affirm its reservations as to its presence. The many speakers who had alluded to the present situation in the Gulf area had failed to mention the presence in the Gulf of foreign naval vessels carrying nuclear weapons, whose purpose was not to defend the people of Kuwait but to attack Iraq. Kuwait was an integral part of Iraq and the Iraqi forces had entered the territory at the request of the new Kuwaiti Government for the purpose of defending Kuwait's people and their revolution.

The PRESIDENT said that Kuwait was a State Party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. All participants in the Conference were Members of the United Nations and, as such, had to be guided by Security Council resolutions 660, 661 and 662. The presence of the delegation of Kuwait at the Conference was entirely in order.

The meeting rose at 5.30 p.m.